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A Neurocomputational Model of Analogical Reasoning and
its Breakdown in Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration
Robert G. Morrison1, Daniel C. Krawczyk1, Keith J. Holyoak1,
John E. Hummel1, Tiffany W. Chow2, Bruce L. Miller3,
and Barbara J. Knowlton1

Abstract
& Analogy is important for learning and discovery and is
considered a core component of intelligence. We present a
computational account of analogical reasoning that is compatible with data we have collected from patients with cortical
degeneration of either their frontal or anterior temporal
cortices due to frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD).
These two patient groups showed different deficits in picture

INTRODUCTION
Analogy is ubiquitous in human learning and discovery
(Gentner, Holyoak & Kokinov, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), and has long been viewed as a core component of intelligence (Sternberg, 1977; Spearman,
1923). Research on analogies in the psychometric tradition has focused on four-term problems, for example:
BLACK:WHITE::NOISY:?(1) QUIET(2) NOISIER.
Several processes are required to solve such problems
successfully. The reasoner needs to: (1) encode the
terms of the analogy; (2) search semantic memory for a
relation that connects the first two terms, BLACK and
WHITE (opposite); (3) bind this relation to the specific
concepts being related in working memory (i.e., form
the proposition ‘‘BLACK is the opposite of WHITE’’);
and (4) map the resulting proposition to the third and
possible fourth terms to infer an answer (BLACK maps to
NOISY and WHITE maps to QUIET, based on the
proposition ‘‘NOISY is the opposite of QUIET’’).
Analogical reasoning thus requires the ability to retrieve
information from semantic memory, together with the
ability to form and manipulate mental representations of
relations between objects and events in working
memory.
The goal of the present article is to present evidence
concerning the breakdown of the component processes
of analogical reasoning in patients suffering from cortical
degeneration, and to simulate the findings using a
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and verbal analogies: frontal lobe FTLD patients tended to make
errors due to impairments in working memory and inhibitory
abilities, whereas temporal lobe FTLD patients tended to make
errors due to semantic memory loss. Using the ‘‘Learning and
Inference with Schemas and Analogies’’ model, we provide a
specific account of how such deficits may arise within neural
networks supporting analogical problem solving. &

neurocomputational model of analogical reasoning,
‘‘Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies’’
(LISA; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003). Previous research has shed some light on the neural substrate of
analogical reasoning, and numerous computational
models of analogy have been developed. However, the
links between detailed process models of high-level
reasoning and investigations of its neural basis have
been tenuous. Our aim is to provide an example of
how a computational model of reasoning can be used to
help understand the processes that operate at the
neural level to enable complex reasoning in normal
individuals, and how frontal versus temporal lobe degeneration may selectively impair these processes.
Neural Substrate for Analogical Reasoning
Both computational analyses and empirical evidence
suggest that analogical reasoning depends on working
memory. For example, experiments utilizing dual-task
methodology have shown that the processes of binding
and mapping used in analogical reasoning require working memory (Morrison, Holyoak, & Truong, 2001; Waltz,
Lau, Grewal, & Holyoak, 2000; Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998). Other studies have shown that
working memory is at least in part realized in subareas of
the prefrontal cortex, which have been implicated both
in tasks that involve simple short-term maintenance and
in more complex manipulation tasks characteristic of the
central executive (see Kane & Engle, 2003; Miller &
Cohen, 2001; D’Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 2000, for
reviews).
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16:2, pp. 260–271

Recent studies have implicated the prefrontal cortex
specifically in reasoning tasks. Wharton et al. (2000) used
positron emission tomography to investigate brain activation associated with solving geometric analogy problems. Participants judged whether two sets of objects
were identical (literal condition) or analogous (analogy
condition). Regions active during analogy but not during
literal comparison included the left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, Brodmann’s area (BA) 44 and 45 (also see Luo
et al., in press). Other studies have examined the Ravens
Progressive Matrices test (RPM; Raven, 1938), a task
cognitively and psychometrically similar to analogical
reasoning (Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984). Waltz
et al. (1999) found that frontal lobe FTLD patients
showed a marked deficit in RPM-type problems that
required integration of two relations compared with
normal controls and FTLD patients with anterior temporal lobe damage. The frontal lobe FTLD patients performed comparably to the other groups on less complex
RPM-type problems that could be solved using zero or
one relation. Waltz et al. interpreted this result, as well as
similar findings with deductive reasoning problems, as
evidence that the prefrontal cortex is important for the
integration of multiple relations, a process required to
solve reasoning problems that are relatively complex
(Robin & Holyoak, 1995; Halford, 1993; Halford, Wilson
& Phillips, 1998). Several studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have shown bilateral
prefrontal cortex activation during RPM problem solving
(Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, & Glover, 1997) with
progressively greater involvement of the right dorsolateral and anterior prefrontal cortex at higher levels of
relational complexity (Kroger et al., 2002; Christoff et al.,
2001). Integrating relations requires the brain to rapidly
acquire new connections (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997,
2003), a capability that has been described as one of
the core functions of the prefrontal cortex (Miller &
Cohen, 2001; Rolls, 1996). Cell recordings with primates
(Asaad, Rainer, & Miller, 1998), as well as human studies
(Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001), have demonstrated the underlying neural correlates of such rapid
learning associated with the prefrontal cortex.
Processing analogies also is likely to utilize inhibitory
mechanisms to manage information in working memory.
Considering our earlier verbal analogy example:
BLACK:WHITE::NOISY:?(1) QUIET(2) NOISIER,
if the semantic association between NOISY and NOISIER
is stronger than that between NOISY and QUIET, the
correct analogical response, then QUIET may initially be
less active than the distractor item, NOISIER. Thus,
during analogical reasoning, it may be important to
inhibit information that is semantically related to the
analogy but competes against the relational match.
Behavioral studies of analogical mapping have shown
that the ability to identify relational correspondences is

impaired when competing featural matches are present
(e.g., Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Ross, 1987, 1989; Gentner &
Toupin, 1986). More generally, many researchers have
suggested that inhibition is an important mechanism for
complex cognition (see Kane & Engle, 2003; Dempster
& Brainerd, 1995; Dagenbach & Carr, 1994, for reviews),
and that changes in inhibitory control may explain
important developmental trends (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990; Diamond, 1990; Hasher & Zacks, 1988) and
individual differences (Kane & Engle, 2003; Dempster,
1991) in complex cognition.
Many researchers have viewed inhibition as an important function of the prefrontal cortex (see Kane & Engle,
2003; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Shimamura, 2000, for reviews). Many complex executive tasks associated with
frontal lobe functioning (e.g., Tower of Hanoi or London, Wisconsin Card Sorting) have important inhibitory
components (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, &
Howerter, 2000; Welsh, Satterlee-Cartmell, & Stine,
1999). Shimamura (2000) has suggested that the role
of the prefrontal cortex is to dynamically filter information, a process that requires the use of both activation
and inhibition to keep information in working memory
relevant to the current goal. Miller and Cohen (2001)
have suggested that ‘‘the ability to select a weaker, taskrelevant response (or source of information) in the face
of competition from an otherwise stronger, but taskirrelevant one [is one of the most] fundamental aspects
of cognitive control and goal-directed behavior’’ (p. 170),
and is a property of the prefrontal cortex.
An addition to working memory and inhibitory mechanisms, analogical reasoning also requires the ability to
access semantic information in order to retrieve and
encode the relations relevant to the analogy. While there
is considerable debate about how semantic information
is stored in the brain (Markowitsch, 2000), it seems clear
that the temporal lobes are critical for the preservation
of semantic memory (Hodges, 2000) and the relational
information necessary for analogical reasoning. The
anterior temporal cortex appears to be particularly
important for verbally mediated conceptual knowledge
(Mummery et al., 1999; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, &
Haxby, 1996).
Overview of the Present Study
In this study, we report two experiments investigating the
role of the prefrontal cortex and the anterior temporal
cortex in analogical reasoning, and a LISA simulation of
the results of the second study. These experiments were
performed with patients diagnosed with frontotemporal
lobar degeneration (FTLD). FTLD is a regional neurodegenerative etiology of dementia distinct from Alzheimer’s
disease (e.g., Hodges & Miller, 2001; Neary et al., 1998).
Based on clinical features and neuroimaging (see
Figure 1), FTLD patients can be divided based on their
primary locus of damage. Frontal lobe FTLD patients
Morrison et al.
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typically present with behavioral disturbances and have
damage to the orbital medial regions of the prefrontal
cortex, which extends into the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and inferior frontal gyrus as the disease progresses
(Hodges & Miller, 2001). Temporal lobe FTLD presents
with a loss of conceptual knowledge, fluent aphasia, and
late emotional changes. Damage is most apparent in the
anterior temporal cortex (Hodges & Miller, 2001). Studies
of FTLD patients can provide a useful complement to
neuroimaging studies by making it possible to investigate
the global roles of frontal and anterior temporal lobes in
reasoning. The present study compares the performance
of frontal and temporal lobe FTLD patients to that of ageand education-matched controls.
Analogy Experiments
Both experiments involved solving analogy problems. In
Experiment 1, participants answered analogy problems
based on a paradigm initially developed by Markman

and Gentner (1993). On each trial in this task, participants first studied pairs of pictures containing multiple
objects and at least one dominant relation, which is
present in both pictures (see Figure 2 for an example).
The experimenter then indicated one object in the top
picture and asked the participant to select one object in
the bottom picture that ‘‘goes with’’ the indicated
object. In each case, the indicated object could plausibly
be mapped to two different objects in the bottom
picture—one that matches based on featural attributes
(a featural match), and one that matches based on its
relation(s) to other object(s), that is, based on an
analogy between the two pictures (a relational match).
Typically, participants select either the featural or relational match. To identify the relational match for these
complex visual analogies, it will generally be necessary to
encode and manipulate multiple relations among the
depicted objects. Using this task, Waltz et al. (2000)
demonstrated that dual tasks designed to interfere with
working memory decrease the number of relational

Figure 1. Positron emission tomography scan from patient HS at rest. HS, who was diagnosed with frontal lobe FTLD (later autopsy confirmed),
participated in both Experiments 1 and 2.
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lems varied the association between C:D and C:D0 word
pairs. A semantic facilitation index (SFI) was calculated
for each problem to characterize the association of the
correct relational pair (C:D) relative to the distractor pair
(C:D0). For example, for the problem
PLAY:GAME::GIVE:?(1) PARTY(2) TAKE

Figure 2. Example problem from picture analogy task (Experiment 1).
Adapted from Tohill and Holyoak (2000).

responses given, with a corresponding increase in the
number of featural responses. In addition to the working
memory resources needed to represent and manipulate
relations, this task likely requires inhibition of the salient
featural match in order to facilitate relational processing.
We hypothesized that frontal lobe FTLD patients will
give fewer relational responses because they have diminished ability to represent relations and learn analogical correspondences, and because they will have
difficulty inhibiting the salient featural match in order
to produce a less-salient relational response.
In addition, the picture analogy task also requires
retrieval of conceptual knowledge from semantic memory to encode the relations necessary to process the
analogy. We hypothesized that temporal lobe FTLD
patients would favor featural over relational responses
due to the perceptual similarity of featural matches to
the indicated objects and the patients’ diminished semantic memory, making access to the relational information necessary to process the analogy more difficult.
In Experiment 2, we examined a verbal analogy task
that allowed us to better characterize the specific analogy
processing failures in the frontal and temporal lobe FTLD
patients. Problems of the form A:B:C:D or D0 (adapted
from Sternberg & Nigro, 1980) were used. These prob-

the C:D pair (GIVE:PARTY) is less associated than is the
C:D0 pair (GIVE:TAKE), giving the problem a negative
SFI score. The problems were divided into three groups:
negative SFI, neutral SFI, and positive SFI.
We predicted a different pattern of results for frontal
and temporal patients. Because these simple four-term
analogy problems are each based on a single relation
between the A and B terms (unlike the more complex
picture analogies used in Experiment 1), it should be
possible for frontal patients to perform the basic analogical mapping despite their diminished working memory. In the positive and neutral SFI conditions, the
analogical answer (D) does not face competition from
a competitor (D0) that is more strongly associated with
the C term. Accordingly, the analogical answer can
simply be activated and produced as a response. However, in the negative SFI condition, the D0 foil is in fact
more strongly associated with C than is the analogical
response D. It follows that in order to generate the
analogical answer, it will be necessary not just to activate
it, but to rapidly learn the analogical correspondences so
that activation of the analogical answer D can be maintained in the face of automatic activation of the foil D0. It
will then be necessary to inhibit the D0 response so that
the analogical response D can be made. Because of their
postulated deficits in both rapid learning and inhibitory
control, we predicted that frontal patients would be
selectively impaired in the negative SFI condition relative to the positive and neutral SFI conditions. In
contrast, we predicted that temporal patients would
show a more uniform decline in verbal analogy performance across all three conditions due to their loss of the
conceptual information necessary to encode the relations in the analogy problem.
LISA: A Neurocomputational Model of Analogical
Reasoning
In an effort to substantiate the importance of semantic
memory, working memory, and inhibition in analogical
reasoning, we modeled the deficits in patient performance in LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003), a
symbolic–connectionist model of analogical reasoning.
Although numerous computational models of analogy
have been developed (see French, 2002, for a review),
no other such model has been used to simulate neuropsychological data.
LISA represents propositions using a hierarchy of
distributed and localist units (see Methods, Figure 5).
LISA includes both a long-term memory for propositions
Morrison et al.
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and concept meanings and a limited-capacity working
memory. LISA’s working memory representation, which
uses neural synchrony to encode role-filler bindings,
provides a natural account of the capacity limits of
working memory because it is only possible to have a
finite number of bindings simultaneously active and
mutually out of synchrony (see Appendix A in Hummel
& Holyoak, 2003, for details). Units representing one
analog (the driver) are activated in working memory,
and reasoning proceeds by passing activation from these
units through distributed semantic units to units representing the recipient analog in long-term memory. As
units in the recipient analog are fired they enter working
memory, remaining in active memory when they are not
currently being fired. LISA also includes a set of mapping connections between units of the same type (e.g.,
object, predicate) in separate analogs. These connections grow whenever the corresponding units are active
simultaneously, and thereby permit LISA to learn the
correspondences between structures in separate analogs. They also permit correspondences learned early in
mapping to influence the correspondences learned later. Hummel and Holyoak (1997, 2003) hypothesized
that the rapid learning of mapping connections is an
important function of working memory as implemented
in the prefrontal cortex, consistent with recent work by
Asaad et al. (1998). The behavioral experiments and
computational simulations reported here serve as additional tests of this hypothesis.
In addition to the mapping connections, several other
aspects of LISA’s operation also map onto functions
associated with the prefrontal cortex and anterior temporal cortex. Inhibition (considered an important function of the prefrontal cortex) plays a central role in
several aspects of LISA. These include: (a) LISA’s ability
to select items for placement into working memory; (b)
its working memory capacity for role-filler bindings; (c)
its ability to control the spreading of activation in the

recipient (i.e., its ability to disambiguate which elements
of the recipient correspond to the active units in the
driver); and (d) its ability to use competition among
mapping connections to enforce structural constraints
on the discovery of analogical mappings, particularly the
constraint that mappings tend to be one-to-one (see
Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). Damage to the prefrontal
cortex is expected to adversely affect all these aspects of
LISA’s ability to solve analogies. Damage to the anterior
temporal cortex—and the resulting loss of semantic
knowledge—corresponds in LISA to a loss of connections between the semantic properties of relational roles
(i.e., semantic units) and units representing those roles
in long-term memory.

RESULTS
Experiment 1: Picture Analogy Task
The results from the picture analogy task are summarized in Figure 3. Frontal lobe FTLD patients chose
fewer relational responses and more featural responses
than control participants, t(18) = 5.2, p < .001 and
t(18) = 4.0, p < .001, respectively. Frontal lobe FTLD
patients showed a trend toward choosing more unrelated choices than control participants, but this trend
was not reliable, t(16) = 1.6, p = .14. Likewise, temporal lobe FTLD patients also chose fewer relational
responses and more featural responses than did control participants, t(18) = 3.8, p = .001 and t(18) = 3.0,
p = .007, respectively. Temporal lobe FTLD patients
chose no more unrelated objects than did control
participants, t(18) = 0.527, ns.
When frontal lobe FTLD patients did report relational
answers, they usually were solving problems in which
the relational match was also spatially aligned (e.g.,
objects on the left in both top and bottom pictures),
or in which the target object and the relational match

Figure 3. Results of picture
analogy task (Experiment 1).
Both frontal and temporal lobe
FTLD patients show a reliable
decrease in the number of
relational responses, with a
corresponding increase in
featural responses, compared
to age- and education-matched
control participants.
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Figure 4. Results of verbal
analogy task (Experiment 2).
(A) Temporal lobe FTLD
patients show a uniform
decrease in verbal analogy
performance regardless of SFI
problem type, whereas frontal
lobe FTLD patients show a
greater deficit in negative SFI
problems than in neutral or
positive problems. Error bars
reflect ±1 standard error of the
mean. (B) Simulation of patient
performance using the LISA
model.

also shared some perceptual similarity. This finding
suggests that frontal lobe FTLD patients were more
likely to choose the relational answer when it was
supported by perceptual cues, minimizing the need to
inhibit competing information. Temporal lobe FTLD
patients distributed their relational responses more
evenly across the set of 10 picture pairs.

ipants, F(1,19) = 18.8, MSE = 0.038, p < .001. Testing
our specific hypothesis, we found that frontal lobe FTLD
patients showed a specific deficit in negative SFI problems relative to neutral and positive SFI problems relative to control participants, F(1,19) = 5.0, MSE = 0.140,
p = .04. In contrast, temporal lobe FTLD patients did
not show this pattern, F(1,19) < 1, MSE = 0.140, ns.

Experiment 2: Verbal Analogy Task

Simulation of Verbal Analogy Task in LISA

The results from the verbal analogy task are summarized
in Figure 4A. Frontal lobe FTLD patients made more
errors than did control participants, F(1,19) = 11.5,
MSE = 0.038, p = .003. Likewise, temporal lobe FTLD
patients also made more errors than did control partic-

LISA simulations were performed for the verbal analogy
task, which allowed better control of stimulus variables
than did the picture analogy task. Our intent was to
model three key characteristics of the verbal analogy
data presented in Figure 4A: (1) control participants
Morrison et al.
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show no effect of SFI problem type; (2) temporal lobe
FTLD patients show depressed performance that is
relatively unaffected by SFI problem type; and (3)
frontal lobe FTLD patients show a specific deficit on
negative SFI problems relative to neutral and positive
SFI problems. A full description of the assumptions
made in modeling the verbal analogy task is presented
in the Methods section of this article. In brief, we
created representations for the various SFI problem
types by assuming word pairs that are highly associated
in long-term memory have more relational instances
(i.e., propositions explicitly relating them) in long-term
memory relative to less associated word pairs. Frontal
lobe FTLD patient performance was simulated in LISA
by decreasing the learning rate for mapping connections and recipient inhibition level. In contrast, temporal lobe FTLD patient performance was simulated by
increasing the semantic death rate (the probability, p, of
losing a connection between a semantic unit representing a relational role and a predicate unit for that role).
These alterations were based on the current conceptions of the deficits caused by these two subtypes of
FTLD: Frontal lobe damage results in the loss of ability
to rapidly form associations and inhibit irrelevant stimuli, whereas temporal lobe damage leads to semantic
memory loss.
Because of the stochastic nature of the simulations,
we ran 40 trials per problem type with model parameter
settings corresponding to the various patient groups.
LISA’s mean percent correct for each of the conditions is
shown in Figure 4B; the model’s performance can be
compared with the patient data shown in Figure 4A. The
simulation results, like the patient data, show all three
patterns described above. Additional simulations revealed that to simulate the performance of frontal lobe
FTLD patients, it is in fact necessary to impair both LISA’s
rapid learning and its recipient inhibition; neither factor
alone is sufficient.

DISCUSSION
Our goal in this study was to investigate the neural basis
of analogical reasoning. In two experiments, we found
that frontal and temporal lobe FTLD patients both
exhibit deficits in analogical reasoning relative to agematched controls, but that the underlying basis for their
deficits appears to differ. When given pairs of complex
pictures (Experiment 1), both patient groups were
impaired in selecting a relation-based match for an
object in the presence of a salient feature-based match.
Although their diminished level of relational responses
was comparable, there was some evidence that the
underlying deficit differed for the two groups. Frontal
lobe FTLD patients were relatively likely to generate the
relational response for those picture pairs in which
perceptual cues, such as spatial position, were correlated with the relational response, suggesting that their
266
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overall relational deficit was due at least in part to
impairment in the ability to inhibit the competing
feature-based match. In contrast, temporal lobe FTLD
patients were more uniformly impaired in relational
responding across all picture pairs, suggesting that their
underlying deficit involved loss of the conceptual knowledge required to encode the depicted relations.
The dissociation between the deficits of the two patient
groups was revealed more clearly in Experiment 2, in
which participants were asked to solve two-alternative
verbal four-term analogy problems in which the association strength of the analogical response was greater
than (positive SFI), equal to (neutral SFI), or less
than (negative SFI) that of the foil. These problems
can be solved on the basis of a single relation, and
hence, even frontal lobe FTLD patients are capable of
performing the necessary mapping and making the
analogical response for positive and neutral SFI problems. However, frontal lobe FTLD patients were selectively impaired in solving the negative SFI problems,
which require rapid learning of the analogical response
so that its activation can be maintained, coupled with
inhibition of the more highly associated foil. Temporal
lobe FTLD patients, in contrast, were more uniformly
impaired across all problem types, as would be expected if the source of their reasoning deficit involved
neither analogical mapping nor inhibition, but rather
loss of the underlying conceptual knowledge in longterm memory required to encode the relation between
the A and B terms of the analogy. This finding is
consistent with many studies of patients with temporal
lobe FTLD that have found poor semantic memory
performance in patients with damage to the anterior
temporal cortex (Mummery et al., 1999; Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1996).
The postulated deficits in the frontal and temporal
lobe FTLD patient groups on the verbal analogy task
were modeled within an integrated neurocomputational model of analogical reasoning, LISA (Hummel &
Holyoak, 1997, 2003). We were able to simulate the
observed pattern of frontal lobe deficits by impairing
the rate of rapid learning of analogical connections,
coupled with reduction of inhibitory control. Both
rapid learning (Cools et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al.,
2001; Rolls, 2000; Asaad et al., 1998) and inhibition
(Miller & Cohen, 2001; Shimamura, 2000) appear to be
key functions of the prefrontal cortex. When both
these functions (not just either one alone) were
impaired in LISA, the model yielded the pattern of
selective impairment on negative SFI problems shown
by frontal lobe FTLD patients. When the extent of
semantic death (loss of connections between semantic
units representing a relational role and a predicate unit
for that role) was increased in LISA, thereby modeling
a loss of conceptual knowledge in the anterior temporal cortex, the simulation yielded the pattern of
impairment found for temporal lobe FTLD patients: a
Volume 16, Number 2

relatively uniform decrease in accuracy across all verbal
analogy problems, regardless of SFI condition.
In summary, the LISA simulations demonstrate that
‘‘computational lesioning’’ of rapid learning mechanisms
and the inhibitory control of working memory yield
deficits in analogical reasoning qualitatively similar to
those observed with frontal lobe FTLD patients, whereas
random destruction of connections within semantic
memory yield deficits qualitatively similar to those observed with temporal lobe FTLD patients. The present
study constitutes an initial step toward the goal of
understanding the mechanisms of high-level human
reasoning at a level that makes contact with what is
known about cortical functioning.

METHODS
Experiment 1: Picture Analogy Task
Participants
Characteristics of participants in Experiment 1 are
summarized in Table 1. Patients included in the study
were diagnosed with FTLD according to the diagnostic
criteria described in Neary et al. (1998). In addition,
patients included in the study had abnormal scan data
(SPECT, PET, or structural MRI; see Figure 1) and
Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE) scores over
15. There were no reliable differences between patient
groups and matched controls with respect to age and
educational attainment. Patients and controls were
paid US$10 in exchange for participation in a onehour testing session.
Materials
Picture analogy problems consisted of 10 pairs of pictures, eight provided by Markman and Gentner (1993)
and two by Tohill and Holyoak (2000). Each of the
pictures showed a visual scene involving three or more
objects with at least one relation linking two of the
objects (see Figure 2). In each problem, the same
relation was present in both pictures; however, at least
one of the objects linked by the relation was different in
the two pictures (e.g., restrain [man, dog]; restrain
Table 1. Characteristics of Patient and Control Participants for
Experiment 1: Picture Analogy
Number of
Participants

Mean
Age

Mean
Education

Mean
MMSE

Frontal lobe
FTLD patients

7

64.7

15.9

25.7

Temporal lobe
FTLD patients

6

68.3

17.8

24.3

Control
participants

8

66.2

15.8

na

Group

[tree, dog]). One object (e.g., man) in the top picture
could be matched to an object in the bottom picture
based either on a shared relational role (e.g., tree) or
featural overlap (e.g., boy). Each problem appeared on a
single sheet of paper.
Procedure
Participants were tested with a modification of Markman
and Gentner’s (1993) ‘‘one-map’’ procedure. Participants studied each problem for 10 sec. After this study
period, the experimenter pointed to the critical object in
the top picture and asked the participant to point to one
object in the bottom picture that ‘‘goes with’’ the
indicated object in the top picture. Participants indicated
their choice by pointing or saying the name of the
object. Problems were presented in a fixed order randomly determined before the study. There were no
additional instructions given to the participant and there
were no example problems.
Experiment 2: Verbal Analogy Task
Participants
Characteristics of participants in Experiment 2 are summarized in Table 2. Patients were selected using the
same criteria as in Experiment 1 and also received US$10
for participating in a testing session. Word association
ratings were collected from 150 undergraduate students
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) who
received extra course credit in exchange for participating. Verbal analogy problems were evaluated for difficulty by 54 UCLA undergraduate students who also
received course credit in exchange for participating.

Materials
The verbal analogies were selected from a set of 200
two-choice verbal analogy problems provided by Michael Gardner (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). The problems
were of the type A:B:C:D or D0 where participants must
select between choices D and D0 based on the relationship between A and B. The correct relation pair is
designated C:D and the distractor pair is C:D0. Each pair
of words (A:B, C:D, and C:D0) were related by one of five
common relations (same, opposite, function, linear
ordering, category). Word association ratings for the
C–D and C–D0 pairs were collected from 150 UCLA
undergraduates. Participants were asked to rate ‘‘how
associated’’ the individual word pairs were using a
5-point scale. These values were normalized and an
SFI was calculated for each problem. The SFI was
defined as the difference between the z-score of the
word association for the correct pair (C:D) minus
the incorrect pair (C:D0). Thus, when the SFI is positive
for a problem, semantic associations favor the correct
Morrison et al.
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Table 2. Characteristics of Patient and Control Participants for
Experiment 2: Verbal Analogy
Number of
Participants

Mean
Age

Mean
Education

Mean
MMSE

Frontal lobe
FTLD patients

7

64.7

15.9

25.7

Temporal lobe
FTLD patients

5

67.6

17.5

25

10

64.2

16.4

Group

Control
participants

na

Procedure
Problems were presented one at a time using a notebook computer. An instruction screen containing one
example was read to each participant and they had the
opportunity to ask questions. After completion of a
practice session of five problems, the experimenter
began the task. After the participant indicated their
choice either verbally or by pointing, the experimenter
recorded their choice on the computer. Problems were
presented in random order to each participant.
Simulation of Verbal Analogy Results in LISA

analogical response. When the SFI is negative, semantic
associations between C and D0 favor the incorrect analogical response. Based on their SFI values, problems
were divided into positive (SFI > .3), negative (SFI <
.3) and neutral (.3  SFI  .3) SFI groups. These
problems were normed for difficulty on 54 UCLA students, and 24 problems were chosen based on SFI,
accuracy and correct RT.

LISA represents propositions using a hierarchy of units
(see Figure 5 for a schematic representation of LISA’s
architecture). At the bottom of the hierarchy, ‘‘semantic’’ units (small circles in Figure 5) represent objects
and relational roles in a distributed fashion. Consider
the proposition becomes (prince, king). Each role of the
becomes relation would be represented by units coding
for its semantic content (e.g., prior-state for the first
role, end-state for the second, and transition for both).

Figure 5. Modeling the verbal analogy task (the A:B:C:D or D0 analogy problem) in LISA. The driver is represented by a set of hierarchical units that
encode objects A and B that are related by relation r. The recipient is represented by sets of units that encode the correct relational response (D) as
related to C by relation r. The competing response is also represented in the recipient, but by units associating C and D0 by the relation s. The ratio
of proposition units in the driver for the r(C:D) and s(C:D0) is varied according to the SFI type of the problem.
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Similarly, the arguments ‘‘prince’’ and ‘‘king’’ would be
represented by units specifying their meaning (e.g.,
person, male, royalty). Predicate and object units
(triangles and large circles, respectively, in Figure 5)
represent relational roles and their fillers in a localist
fashion, and have bidirectional excitatory connections
to the corresponding semantic units. Subproposition
(SP) units (rectangles in Figure 5) bind roles to their
arguments, and have bidirectional connections to the
corresponding predicate and object units. In the case of
becomes (prince, king), one SP would bind ‘‘prince’’ to
the first role of becomes, and another would bind
‘‘king’’ to the second. At the top of the hierarchy,
proposition (P) units bind role-filler bindings into complete propositions via excitatory connections to the
corresponding SPs. A complete analog (i.e., situation,
story or event) is represented by the collection of
semantic, predicate, object, SP and P units that collectively code the propositions in that analog. Separate
analogs do not share object, predicate, SP or P units.
However, all analogs are connected to the same set of
semantic units. The semantic units thus permit the
units in one analog to communicate with the units in
others.
For the purposes of memory retrieval and analogical
mapping (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997) as well as analogical inference and schema induction (Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), analogs are divided into two mutually
exclusive sets: a driver and one or more recipients.
The sequence of events is controlled by the driver: One
(or at most three) at a time, propositions in the driver
become active (i.e., enter working memory). When a
proposition enters working memory, the binding of its
roles to their arguments is represented by synchrony of
firing: All the units under a given SP fire in synchrony
with one another, and separate SPs fire out of synchrony
with one another. The result on the semantic units is a
set of mutually desynchronized patterns of activation:
One pattern for each active SP (i.e., role binding) in the
driver. In the case of becomes (prince, king), the semantic features of ‘‘prince’’ would fire in synchrony with the
features of the first role of becomes, while ‘‘king’’ fires in
synchrony with the second. To represent the proposition becomes (king, prince), LISA would activate exactly
the same semantic units, but their synchrony relations
would be reversed, with ‘‘king’’ firing in synchrony with
the first role of becomes, and ‘‘prince’’ firing with the
second. The resulting patterns of activation on the
semantic units drive the activation of propositions in
the various recipient analogs, and serve as the basis for
analogical mapping, inference, schema induction, and
the other functions LISA performs (Hummel & Holyoak,
1997, 2003). The final component of the LISA architecture is a set of mapping connections between units of
the same type (e.g., object, predicate, etc.) in separate
analogs. These connections grow whenever the
corresponding units are active simultaneously, and

thereby permit LISA to learn the correspondences between structures in separate analogs.
To model the verbal analogies solved by the various
patient groups in this study, we made several assumptions about the way people represent and solve these
problems. In the positive SFI condition, there are more
instances of relations matching A:B and C:D (the correct
response) in long-term memory than there are instances
of relations matching C:D0 (the incorrect choice); in the
negative SFI condition, there are more instances matching the incorrect choice; and in the neutral SFI condition, the two choices are matched. In the simulations,
the numbers of relations assumed was 4:2, 2:4 and 3:3,
respectively. The task involves mapping the A:B pair into
long-term memory to find a match. That is, Relation 1
(A, B) serves as the driver, and the various Relation 1 (C,
D) and Relation 2 (C, D0) propositions are in the
recipient. Finding a match, that is, deciding whether
the correct answer is D or D0, is based on monitoring the
units representing D and D0 to determine which becomes more active.
Damage to the anterior temporal cortex corresponds
in LISA to a loss of connections between the semantic
properties of relational roles (i.e., semantic units) and
units representing those roles in long-term memory. It
was assumed that all types of participants (including
normal controls) suffer from some amount of ‘‘noise’’
in their semantic representation of the situation at
hand. This was modeled as a random input (in the
range 0. . .r) added to the inputs to the semantic units
at each instant in time. For reference, a semantic unit
receives an input of approximately 1.0 from any driver
or recipient unit to which it is connected, so the value
of r represents a proportion of this (nonrandom) input.
For these simulations the value of r was .33 for all
conditions.
We also assumed that some proportion, p, of the
connections from semantic units to units representing
tokens of relational roles (predicate units) and to object
fillers (object units) are randomly lost (‘‘semantic
death’’). To simulate normal controls and frontal lobe
FTLD patients, we set p to 0.1 (i.e., LISA forgets 10% of
the semantic connections in these conditions); to simulate temporal lobe FTLD patients, p was set to 0.75.
That is, we assume temporal lobe FTLD patients have
lost much of their semantic knowledge of what the
various relations mean.
We assume one cost of frontal degeneration is a
general loss of the ability to inhibit irrelevant information. Accordingly, to simulate the frontal lobe FTLD
patients’ performance, we reduced ability of units in
the recipient analogs to inhibit one another to 0.4; to
simulate controls and temporal lobe FTLD patients, this
parameter was left at its default value of 1.0. We assume
that another function of the frontal lobes is to maintain a
representation of the correspondences discovered during analog‘ical mapping (i.e., the rapid learning of new
Morrison et al.
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associations). Accordingly, to simulate frontal lobe FTLD
patients, we reduced the mapping connection learning
rate from 0.9 (its default value in LISA) to 0.4. To
simulate controls and temporal lobe FTLD patients, this
parameter was left at its default value of 0.9.
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